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The U.S. Commitment to the GATT




The United States (U.S.) has often been described as a nation without an
industrial policy. In fact, however, as a U.S. government official told represen-
tatives of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
nations in 1982,
We do have [an industrial policy]. It is simpler than the policies some of you have
adopted. It requires no major public expenditure, no planning and no direction by
government. The key decisions are left to those closest to the market-the firms
themselves. But our policy, which relies on the free play of market forces to ensure
that structural change and adaptation take place regularly, is a true industry
policy... .
Domestically, U.S. "industrial policy" has been manifested through a general
pattern of government non-intervention in the market; internationally, through a
commitment to a world trade order characterized by free trade and open markets.
Fortified by an abiding belief in the strength of our own private enterprise econ-
omy, we have encouraged our frequently less sanguine trading partners to join
with us in a succession of multilateral commitments, most notably the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 and its satellite agreements, designed
* Associate, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1971, Harvard
University; J.D. 1977, Boston University.
t Partner, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, Washington, D.C. Deputy General
Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1979-1980; Attorney, International Sec-
tion, Office of the General Counsel, United States 'Iteasury, 1975-1979. B.A. 1969, Fordham
University; M.A. 1971, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
I. Telegram to U.S. Dep't of Commerce (undated), available in Certain Steel Products from the
Federal Republic of Germany, Dep't of Commerce Docket No. A-428-004 (reproducing the statement
of the U.S. Representative to the OECD Steel Committee on July 21, 1982).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and 'Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATTI].
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to reduce trade barriers and eliminate mercantilism as a significant factor in
international economic relations.
The extraordinary burst of worldwide economic growth that accompanied
reduction of at-the-border restrictions in the first decades of the GATT system
validated our faith in the merits of an open trading system. In the 1980s, however,
facing a deteriorating trade balance and the decline of many traditionally strong
industrial sectors, the wisdom of continuing our commitment to a system of free
world trade is being questioned. In part the problems of U.S. industry reflect
macroeconomic factors which are unrelated or only marginally related to trade
issues; yet it is also clear that in many instances reversals suffered in international
competition have had a significant adverse effect on the long-term health of
numerous U.S. industries. It is therefore worth reexamining our commitment to
the GATT system, and, in particular, some of the basic assumptions which
underlie that commitment.
The GATT system was established by a fairly homogeneous group of 24
countries in the late 1940s. With the exception of the U.S., the signatory nations
were, for the most part, European or British Commonwealth countries with
market economies. These governments shared a rough consensus on the funda-
mental goals of an international trading system. They intended to avoid the
economic warfare that had characterized international trade in the late 1930s.
Trading relationships were to be governed by a mutual commitment to commonly
understood notions of fairness and equity. This meant allowing producing enter-
prises to compete, according to a set of agreed rules, without national govern-
ment interference intended to affect the competitive outcome. Disputes were to
be resolved by reference to the basic equitable principles shared by the signato-
ries. The signatories believed that the system would ultimately benefit all partici-
pants by permitting producing enterprises to exploit their comparative advantages
and thus optimize the use of the world's resources and maximize the total output
of goods and services available to meet mankind's needs. 3
The U.S. Congress has always harbored reservations about the GATT system.
Although its postwar legislative enactments in the trade arena demonstrate a
commitment to the basic principles of the original GATT consensus, they have
been tempered by the pragmatic concern that our trading partners would not fully
adhere to these principles in practice. 4 Thus, while the Congress has delegated
the authority to negotiate successive rounds of tariff reductions to the Executive,
it has also enacted an array of unilateral trade remedies to counter specific
"unfair" foreign trade practices. These remedies are designed to offset what we
would view as deviations from the original GATT consensus, such as export
subsidies which create artificial comparative advantages for producers in other
nations.
Since the conclusion of the last major round of trade negotiations in 1979, U.S.
3. L. MCQUADE, GATT PLus-A PROPOSAL FOR TRADE REFORM 3 (1976).
4. See Dymock & Vogt, Protectionist Pressures in the U.S. Congress, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 496
(1983).
GAIT SYSTEM 493
attention has focused on the increasing level of foreign government intervention
in trade. Increasing intervention tends to confirm Congressional apprehension
about an open system. To some, this assessment is an illusion created by the
overall lowering of tariffs which has made visible the nontariff barriers (NTBs)
which were barely discernible before. However, the concern over government
intervention goes beyond NTBs themselves. It goes to their very objective: these
and other foreign government policies seek to dictate international competitive
outcomes. This realization, coupled with the fact that America's competitive
edge has been narrowed or lost across a broad spectrum of industries, calls into
question some of the assumptions underlying our postwar trade policy.
I. FAIRNESS: THE BASIC NOTION OF U.S. POSTWAR TRADE POLICY
Perhaps the most basic of these assumptions is that some commonly shared
notion of fairness exists on which to base a world trade order characterized
largely by laissez-faire competition. "Unfair" practices are those which disrupt
that order and prevent enterprises from competing on a "level playing field." The
theory of comparative advantage, the economic justification for laissez-faire,
concludes that all nations benefit from the freest operation of the market. A free
market ensures the most efficient production of goods because individual pro-
ducers maximize their wealth by exploiting their particular factor advantages
(capital, labor, or resources). Government intervention in competition-through
import restrictions, subsidies, or other means-distorts this process, creating an
artificial or unfair comparative advantage, which ultimately detracts from the
general wealth.
The postwar consensus presupposed that the concept of fairness required a
willingness to accept the verdict of the market during the normal course. How-
ever, many of the increasingly heterogeneous group of nations which comprise
the group participating in the GATT system have been unwilling to entrust their
economic future to the vagaries of the market, or to subscribe to the notion that
interference with the market mechanism is unfair. Japan, which joined the GATT
in 1955, systematically set out to create comparative advantages for designated
industries through government promotional measures. It saw nothing unfair
about that process. As a vice-minister of Japan's Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) told the OECD Industry Committee in 1970:
After the war ... Japan's first exports consisted of such things as toys and other
miscellaneous merchandise and low-quality textile products. Should Japan have
entrusted its future in the theory of comparative advantage in these industries
characterized by intensive use of labor? ... If the Japanese economy had adopted
the simple doctrine of free trade and had chosen to specialize in this kind of
industry, it would have almost permanently been unable to break away from the
Asian pattern of stagnation and poverty ... [MITI] decided to establish in Japan
industries which require intensive employment of capital and technology, industries
that in consideration of comparative cost of production should not be the most
inappropriate for Japan, industries such as steel, oil refining, petrochemicals, auto-
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mobiles, aircraft, all sorts of industrial machinery, and electronics, including elec-
tronic computers. 5
It is not surprising that a similar rationale has been embraced by the numerous
developing nations, many just emerging from colonial status, which have joined
the GATT in recent decades. For many of these nations, acceptance of laissez-
faire and the theory of comparative advantage would mean continued subordina-
tion to advanced western economies. Like Japan before them, developing coun-
tries have found that they can create comparative advantages in particular sectors
within a relatively short time through a combination of market protection and
intensive government aid. This combination makes possible, for example, the
acquisition of state-of-the art production equipment and entire "turnkey" plants
from western nations.
The developing countries assert the need to employ measures such as market
protection and subsidies, which would be condemned under our own traditional
notions of fair trade, to offset comparative advantages enjoyed by the advanced
industrial nations. The market distorting effect of such measures is justified by an
appeal to equity. The poorer nations argue that "developing countries are entitled
to a redistribution of the world's wealth as a matter of fundamental fairness."
' 6
Such conflicting notions of fairness have fueled trade disputes in which the U.S.
denounces government intervention and the lack of reciprocity and the develop-
ing countries cite the disparity in wealth between the developed and developing
world. These differing perspectives were highlighted by a 1982 Rio de Janeiro
newspaper editorial, which observed:
Brazil's import policy is now highly protectionist, of course, just what President
Figueiredo and economic area officials have been complaining about in the indus-
trialized world.
But there is a big difference between a developing nation such as Brazil closing
its doors to imports in order to keep its foreign trade balance in surplus and an
economic giant such as the U.S. or Japan cutting off imports from desperate and
needy Third World nations.
The industrialized world must understand the great need for access to markets
that most developing nations face. Protectionism in industrial nations is a selfish
attempt to keep specific unproductive sectors afloat. Protectionism by developing
nations is often the only way for the entire nation to remain solvent.'
5. Address by Vice-Minister of MITI to OECD Industry Committee (1970), reprinted in U.S.
GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 176-77 (1979).
6. Komins, TechnicalAnalysis of the Group "Framework", 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 299, 306
(1980).
7. Import Restrictions, Latin American Daily Post, Sept. 30, 1982, at 4 (FBIS reprint). An editorial
in Jornal do Brasil offered a similar perspective with respect to export subsidies:
Exports are decisive for the survival of some enterprises and for the success of our foreign
trade strategy.
Is Brazil granting subsidies? It is. But who does not? Is Brazil adopting a unilateral
posture? It is. But is there anything more unjustly unilateral than the U.S. rade Act?
... Brazil is willing to play for high stakes in defense of its interest-as the other
international trade partners do, with greater or lesser reasons than Brazil.
High Stakes, Jornal do Brasil, June 13, 1978, at 10 (in Portuguese) (JPRS trans.).
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The fact that the developing countries have secured recognition for their claim to
special treatment within the GATT framework8 underscores the weakening of the
original GATT consensus regarding the nature of fair trade. 9
In general, the GATT principles can no longer be said to form the basis for a
common international understanding of fair trade. Nonintervention by govern-
ments in the market is not only renounced in principle by many governments, but
quietly circumvented in practice even by some of the European nations party to
the original GATT consensus. 10 The result has been the spread of an increasingly
cynical attitude toward the underlying spirit of the original agreement, and a
willingness to contravene that spirit when perceived national interests so re-
quire."1 Thus, while it might be possible to return to the postwar consensus of
"fairness" in trade, it is extremely dangerous for any nation to base its trade
8. Article XXXVI of GATT, added in 1964, provides in pertinent part that "[tihe developed
countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in the negotiations to reduce or
remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of developing countries .... GATT, supra note 2, at
art. XXXVI, 8. In addition, Article 14(4) of the Subsidies Code provides that "there shall be no
presumption that export subsidies granted by developing countries' signatories, result in adverse
effects, as defined in this Agreement, to the trade or production of another signatory." Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619,-U.N.T.S.-. The effect of this
provision has been to largely preclude the use of international dispute settlement procedures to
challenge export subsidies by the LDCs. Graham & Rubin, U.S. Trade Policy Toward Developing
Countries, in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980s 155-57 (T. Graham & S. Rubin eds.
1984).
9. Komins, supra note 6, at 310. The U.S. has responded to the needs of the developing countries
by granting special duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Trade
Act of 1974, §§ 501-505, 88 Stat. 2066, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982). However, the U.S. has
been unwilling to concede to the developing countries the unfettered ability to create comparative
advantage for their industries through state intervention. For example, developing country subsidy
practices remain subject to the U.S. countervailing duty law, 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1671f (1982), which
is considerably more stringent than the current provisions of the Subsidies Code. Graham & Rubin,
supra note 8, at 156.
10. France, for example, has a long tradition of state intervention in the economy, and has
implemented a variety of subtle policies designed to create a competitive edge for its export products.
In the late 1970s, it stimulated its exports to developing countries through so-called mixed credit
packages-the extension of extraordinarily lenient loans and development aid packages linked to
purchases in France. On the average, each loaned franc led to exports to the developing country of
two francs. Mechanisms of French Export Subsidies, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Oct. 6, 1983, at 17 (in
German) (JPRS trans.). However, as the Neue Zurcher Zeitung commented: "[M]any other countries
have not been asleep and have parried the French mixed-credit system with similar programs. . . . [l]t
now seems hardly likely that France could win this variety of the subsidy race, which it itself has
provoked." Id. This is precisely the sort of escalating market intervention that the original GATT
signatories hoped to end through a general agreement on competitive rules. See Jackson, The Birth of
the GAT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 25-26 (1980).
11. Poland evaluated the comparative merits of various export-stimulating measures in 1981. The
Polish journal Zycie Gospodarcze commented: "[S]ubsidizing [exports] violates the GATT resolu-
tions signed by us. It is possible, however, to circumvent these regulations by using various kinds of
loopholes-a return of profits from intermediary stages of production, a return of import tariff and
turnover tax, [and] subsidizing not exports but unprofitable enterprises." Profitability, Foreign Ex-
changes, Concessions, Zycie Gospodarcze, Dec. 13, 1981, at 9 (in Polish) (JPRS trans.). When a
system of international rules heavily dependent upon good faith compliance reaches the point where
signatories probe for loopholes to justify conduct contrary to the basic spirit of the rules, arguably the
system is no longer functioning.
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policy on laissez-faire on the mistaken assumption that such a consensus exists
today.
At present, in many industrial sectors, comparative advantage no longer deter-
mines competitive outcomes. The role of the state is more important. In such an
environment, it is inadequate simply to invoke classic free-market nostrums
when our industries suffer reversals in international competition; that is, to exhort
them to become more competitive, or, alternatively, to accept the inevitability of
their decline so that their resources may be redeployed to other sectors.
II. ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES TO MARKET INTERVENTION
Proponents of laissez-faire do not deny that major distortions of the interna-
tional market can be caused by foreign government intervention. They contend,
however, that such distortions do not justify the rejection of the basic concept of
free world trade. Instead, they argue that these distortions should be offset
individually through negotiations, application of U.S. trade remedies, or redress
under international agreements such as the GATT. This argument erroneously
presupposes that currently available unilateral and multilateral remedies are equal
to the task.
The inadequacy of the GATT dispute settlement procedures as practical reme-
dies has long been apparent. ' 2 They are cumbersome and slow and, as one
observer commented: "[A] 'foot dragger' has many procedural opportunities to
slow down the process. In some circumstances a dispute, whether or not brought
under the mechanism of article XXIII [of the GATT) continues for many years
with no resolution." 3 In addition, selection of a neutral panel to arbitrate dis-
putes is difficult;' 4 the GATT standards, such as "nullification or impairment,"
are ambiguous; 5 and for U.S. industries, access to GATT remedies must be
obtained through the U.S. government, 16 which, for various political and foreign
policy reasons, may be unwilling to take up the cause in an international forum. ' 7
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism "had considerable promise in the early
decades of GATT history; but in recent years, it has become apparent that the
procedure is inadequate." 8
12. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 42.
13. Id. The principal GATT dispute settlement mechanisms are provided under Articles XXII and
XXIII. The various satellite agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to rade, done
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616,-U.N.T.S.-, frequently contain their own
resolution provisions.
14. Gadbaw, The Outlook for GATT as an Institution, in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE
1980s 44 (T. Graham & S. Rubin eds. 1984).
15. See R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 35-38 (1975).
16. Access to the GATT remedies is made available to private parties through the Trade Act of
1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982), which directs the President to take "all appropriate and feasible
action" to enforce U.S. rights under "any trade agreement." See Fisher & Steinhardt, The Enforce-
ment by Private Citizens of the United States under International Trade Agreements, in CURRENT
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 196 (P. Malrory & P. Suchman eds. 1982).
17. As Fisher and Steinhardt point out, the President's decision to act or refrain from acting in
response to a § 301 petition "may have more to do with domestic publicity, congressional relations,
and high foreign policy than the merits of the petition." Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 16, at 196.
18. Jackson, supra note 10, at 41.
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The unilateral remedies of U.S. trade law have proven only partially adequate
as a practical response to foreign government intervention. Import relief, avail-
able under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,19 is a sweeping remedy that
frequently does little to offset the comparative advantage created by a foreign
government. The specialized trade remedies, such as the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws, tailored to offset specific foreign practices are effective in
some specific instances, but they are so narrow in scope that they frequently fail
to offset fully the effects of foreign promotional measures. Grant of relief under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 2 0-a remedial statute which is broader in
scope-is left to the discretion of the Executive, and the political and foreign
policy considerations that usually influence such cases often ensure that no relief
will be granted . 2' Moreover, all of these remedies suffer from a timeliness prob-
lem. Even in those cases where relief is granted, the response usually comes only
after substantial injury to the industry has already occurred.
Finally, while negotiated settlements can ameliorate some of the effects of a
foreign promotional program, the U.S. Government is not always in a position to
obtain a satisfactory result. 22 Negotiations inevitably involve tradeoffs of various
political and economic concessions. Relief may depend on the degree of intran-
sigence of the foreign government and the number and magnitude of concessions
sought by the U.S. Moreover, as with the application of trade remedies, negoti-
ated settlements tend to be reached after substantial injury to a U.S. industry has
already occurred.
I1. WORLD MARKET REALITIES
The competitive reversals suffered by U.S. industries in the 1970s and 1980s
are regarded by many observers as verdicts of the market. U.S. firms have lost
ground, it is said, because they are less efficient, less productive, and less
innovative than their foreign rivals. This conclusion assumes that the world
trading system is functioning as we believe that it should, rather than as it actually
does. Recent international competitive developments illustrate the gap between
the assumptions upon which our trade policy is predicated and world market
realities.
A. Erosion of the U.S. Steel Industry
The U.S. steel industry, which has been seriously depressed since the 1970s,
has been a frequent subject of analysis by proponents of international laissez-
faire. The industry's import penetration levels rose from 12 percent in 1973 to 22
percent in 1982;23 it has suffered from chronically low or negative earnings and
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
21. See Wolff, The Challenge of Foreign Industrial Policy, 15 NAT'L J. 354, 356 (1983).
22. One frequent outcome of negotiated settlements is so-called voluntary restraint agreements
(VRAs) pursuant to which foreign countries agree to limit voluntarily their exports to the U.S.
23. See AM. IRON & STEEL INST., 1982 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 8 (1983).
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inadequate capital investment.2 4 According to most observers, if the industry
does not become more competitive through equipment and plant modernization,
it will shrink drastically, or disappear altogether. In the latter case, the industry's
resources would be redeployed to sectors in which the U.S. enjoys a comparative
advantage. Thereafter, nations which make steel more cheaply would become our
suppliers. Similar solutions have been proposed for other U.S. industries which
suffer international competitive reversals.
Unfortunately, this analysis is usually offered without regard to what the
governments of our trading partners have done and are doing to support their steel
industries. The U.S. steel industry faces numerous competitive disadvantages
including aging plants, a fragmented structure, insufficient access to deep water
transportation, and rising costs. However, many foreign steel industries have
overcome or are overcoming comparable initial disadvantages through extensive
government assistance. Comparative advantage in this sector has in many cases
been created and sustained as much through governmental aid as entrepreneurial
skill.
Most foreign steel industries exist today only as a result of deliberate govern-
ment decisions to establish and expand steel production facilities through mas-
sive subsidies and government-backed debt financing. Japan, the world's leading
steel exporter, created a modern steel industry between the 1950s and early 1970s
through a combination of government loans and government-directed rationing of
low-interest loan capital from private banks to steelmakers. 25 In the European
Community, extensive government financial aid also facilitated the establishment
and expansion of modem steel facilities in the 1960s and 1970s. 26 Finally, during
24. The Congressional Budget Office commented in 1982 that "if a firm loses profitability, it also
loses the ability to generate funds to invest, and thereby finds it more difficult to be profitable in the
future. Domestic steel producers have fallen into this downward spiral." STAFF OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE STEEL INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION
35 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
25. Interest rates in Japan were held at artificially low levels by regulation, creating an excessive
demand for loan capital. This "normalized the practice of credit allocation" by the Bank of Japan
(Japan's central bank) to private banks. ECONOMIC RESEARCH DEP'T, BANK OF JAPAN, THE JAP-
ANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 60 (1978). "[ln the adjustment of debenture flotation and the granting of
credit by the Bank of Japan, priority was given to supplying funds to export industries and the key
industries." Subcomm. on Industrial Finance Problems of the Central Division Committee, Council
on Industrial Structure, Report on Desirable Industrial Financing in the Future (Sept. 29, 1982),
translated in JPRS Doc. No. JAR-84-005, Mar. 21, 1984, at 9. The Japanese steel industry enjoyed
such priority status in the 1960s and 1970s. The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
attributed the Japanese steel industry's comparatively high percentage of efficient continuous casting
equipment to the fact that "the Japanese government and banking system have channeled sufficient
capital at favorable interest rates to the Japanese industry." U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, TECHNOLOGY AND STEEL INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS 326 (1980); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 5, at 185.
26. The Italian government, for example, virtually created Italy's integrated steel industry through
financing arranged by the state holding company, IRI. By 1977, the principal state-owned steel
producer, Italsider, had a debt-to-equity ratio of 14:1. See Biringuccio, Steel is Dying of Billion-
Poisoning. Root Causes of Italsider's Multiple Ailments, II Borghese, Nov. 22, 1981, at 761-64 (in
Italian) (JPRS trans.). The rapid expansion and modernization of the French steel industry in the
1960s and 1970s was made possible by a combination of direct government loans (many subsequently
forgiven) and state-backed financing from the private sector. C. Stoffaes and P. Gadonneix, Officials
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the past decade, in numerous newly-industrializing countries such as Brazil27 and
the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea),2" government subsidies, loans, and
loan guarantees have made possible the import of modem equipment and the
establishment of major steel production facilities which, in a purely laissez-faire
environment, probably could not have been built.
The decision to expand steel production capacity, made concurrently by gov-
ernments in many advanced and developing countries in the 1960s and early and
mid 1970s, resulted in an extraordinary expansion of worldwide steelmaking
capacity through the 1970s. When the long-term growth of world steel demand
began to level off unexpectedly in 1974, the ultimate result was massive global
overcapacity, a problem which has become even more acute in this decade. 29
In a true laissez-faire world trading environment, such overbuilding would
have resulted in a shakeout. Market forces would have eliminated excess capacity
by forcing the less efficient producers out of business or into major retrenchment,
leaving the more efficient producers to supply the world market. Indeed, many
observers of the U.S. steel industry's current problems believe that such a process
is occurring, and conclude that the U.S. industry must become more efficient or
disappear. These observers assume that the steel industry is functioning accord-
ing to the theory of comparative advantage. In fact, the industry's current di-
lemma offers a classic illustration of how the theory of comparative advantage
can be frustrated in practice.
The U.S. steel industry would have experienced difficult times during the past
decade regardless of the nature of foreign competition. A depressed demand
during much of that period was exacerbated by the severe recession in 1982-83.
To a considerable degree, however, the U.S. steel industry's international com-
petitive problems since 1974 are attributable to decisions by the governments of
other steel-producing nations to interfere with the operation of the market. Those
nations deemed the unemployment and economic dislocation which would result
from a shutdown of a portion of their steel industries unacceptable. 30 Un-
of the French Ministry of Industry, State and Steel in France, Report No. 3 (delivered at seminar held
by the International Center of Research and Information on Public and Cooperative Economy, Liege,
Belgium, Sept. 18-20, 1980). In addition to such national aid measures, the authorities of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) extended over $5 billion in low-interest loans to
European steel producers between 1952 and 1982. EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 1982
Financial Report. The Netherlands and West Germany, whose steel industries have been established
largely without government assistance, have repeatedly protested the steel subsidies of their Commu-
nity neighbors.
27. See Expansion Go-Ahead for Siderbras, Metal Bull., Sept. 4, 1981, at 35; Brazilian Steel
Booms, Metal Bull., Oct. 21, 1980, at 39; Brazil Investment Plans, Metal Bull., Dec. 15, 1978, at 40;
Annual Investments in Steel: $3.5 Billion Through 1981, 0 Globo, Apr. 6, 1978, at 22 (in Portuguese)
(JPRS trans.); Greater National Participation in Iron-Steel Plan Foreseen, 0 Estado de Siio Paulo,
May 29, 1977, at 61 (in Portuguese) (JPRS trans.); Problems of National Steel Industry Aired, 0
Estado de Sdo Paulo, June 8, 1975, at 70 (in Portuguese) (JPRS trans.).
28. See KOREAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, INDUSTRY IN KOREA 52-58 (1976); POSCO Gets New
Ultra-modern Furnace, Korea Herald, Feb. 18, 1981, at 1.
29. See generally INT'L IRON & STEEL INST., A HANDBOOK OF WORLD STEEL STATISTIcs (1983).
30. In France, Italy, and Belgium, proposals to close uneconomic steel facilities have regularly
triggered violent social unrest in steel producing regions. As a result, the governments of these
countries have frequently extended additional financial aid to the industry to sustain uneconomic
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economic steel producers were subsidized, protected from imports, and encour-
aged to maintain high domestic prices while disposing of their surplus production
in export markets.
In the EEC, where about one-third of U.S. steel imports originate, most major
integrated steel producers have suffered chronic, major operating deficits since
1975. European governments have engaged in a subsidy race 3 or "subsidy stee-
plechase" 32 to pump government funds into ailing steel producers. In some
cases, periodic subsidy injections have been required simply to enable these
companies to meet their payrolls and continue day-to-day operations. 33 In 1982
the West German Iron and Steel Industry Association estimated that between
1975 and 1983 the governments of Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and
Italy had collectively granted or would grant more than $30 billion in subsidy
funds to their steel industries. 34
The impact on international competition was inevitable. In order to maintain
domestic employment levels, subsidized steel firms have continued high rates of
operation, despite stagnant demand. Surpluses have been exported, often at a
loss. The result is the phenomenon known as "social tons"-steel sold below the
cost of production in foreign markets in order to maintain employment at home. 35
Because the continued ability to export "social tons" is ultimately dependent
upon the flow of subsidies, this phenomenon has the effect of pitting privately
owned, unsubsidized firms against national treasuries. 36 Wirtschaftswoche com-
mented on April 6, 1984:
production. See Crisis of the Benelux Steel Industry, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Oct. 21, 1977, at 11 (in
German) (JPRS trans.); The Sinking of the Steel Industry, L'EsPRESSO, June 26, 1983, at 152-55 (in
Italian) (JPRS trans.); More Unrest as France Confirms Job Cuts, Metal Bull., Oct. 1, 1982, at 29.
Between 1978 and 1982 the West German government poured approximately $1 billion into the ailing
Saarland steel industry. See The Limit has Been Reached, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 8, 1982, at 67, 69 (in
German) (JPRS trans.). According to the Saarland Minister of Finance, "the issue is simply this:
what is cheaper- to subsidize wages or to finance unemployment?" Unemployment or Wage Sub-
sidy, Frankfurter Allegemeine, Dec. 8, 1982 at 12 (in German) (JPRS trans.). In Belgium, proponents
of subsidies argued that "it would be much cheaper for the state to subsidize a job in the steel industry
at approximately 200,000 Belgian francs than it would be to support an unemployed person at as
much as 500,00 Belgian francs annually." EC Commission Criticizes Belgium's Aid to Steel Industry,
Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Jan. 14, 1981, at 13 (in German) (JPRS trans.).
31. German Anger on Subsidies Grows, Metal Bull., Apr. 3, 1981, at 27.
32. Brussels's Blessing for EC Subsidies for Steel Industry. Producers Hard-Pressed in France,
Belgium, and Italy, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Jan. 7, 1982, at 13 (in German) (JPRS trans.).
33. Funds for Cockerill-Sambre?, Metal Bull., Sept. 15, 1981, at 33; New Cash Crisis for Italsider,
Metal Bull., Sept. 4, 1981, at 33; Hainaut-Sambre Bailed Out, Metal Bull., Apr. 16, 1981, at 27;
Holdings Rethink Belgian Rescue, Metal Bull., Aug. 15, 1980, at 33; Walloon Steel Industry Faces
Shortage of Funds, Le Soir, July 9, 1980 at I (in French) (JPRS trans.).
34. Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-Und Stahlindustrie, Practical Experience with Governmental
Assistance to the Steel Industry of the European Community (Feb. 1982) (unpublished report) (copy
on file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies).
35. Cockerill, Belgium's largest steel producer until 1981, reported that the reduced volume of
orders from the EEC forced the company in 1977 to increase its marketing effort in more distant
countries. The company also reported that the desire to maintain a reasonable level of activity in its
plants compelled it on several occasions to accept orders where the price did not cover fixed produc-
tion expenses. See COCKERILL, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT (U.S. Steel Law Dep't trans.).
36. As the chairman of one privately-owned West German firm complained bitterly in 1983: "The
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In the EC as a whole, almost half a million jobs are provided for by steel, and this is
the case above all in the structurally weak regions. With that, politics automatically
comes into play. Instead of leaving it up to the market to correct excess capacities,
reference was made to the employment policy aspect to justify reaching deeply into
the pockets of the EC states. Since 1975, about 80 billion marks have been pumped
above all into the nationalized portion of the steel industry for its support. . . .By
way of the initial subsidizing of weak borderline suppliers, eventually the sound
companies entered a state of crisis. With public financial aid amounting to as much
as 200 marks per ton of steel-which is nearly equivalent to the labor costs-they
could no longer hold their own in the competition. 
3 7
National coffers are not inexhaustible and the European steel subsidies have
strained some badly. 3 8 Nevertheless, private companies, no matter how efficient,
cannot prevail against this kind of competition. In Europe, some highly com-
petitive, privately owned firms have already been driven out of business by their
subsidized rivals;3 9 others have been given major subsidies in an effort to keep
them in the market. 4 Subsidized and dumped European steel has posed a funda-
mental competitive dilemma for the U.S. steel industry. 4' It must match Euro-
[steel] competitors in Italy, France, Belgium and Great Britain have been artificially kept alive since
1975 with subsidies of about 80 billion marks in tax funds. No private enterprise can in the long run
compete against the combined ministers of finance of Europe." Now We Are Fighting for Survival.
Thyssen-Chief Dieter Spethmann on the Crisis in the Steel Industry and State Subsidies, DER
SPIEGEL, May 23, 1983, at 32-42 (in German) (JPRS trans.).
37. Rationalization Pressures May Ease, Wirtschaftswoche, Apr. 6, 1984, at 12-15 (in German)
(JPRS trans.).
38. In 1981 a Dutch delegate to the European Parliament commented that the effect of Belgian steel
subsidies "on the Belgian budget will be felt up to the year 2005, and will place an enormously heavy
burden on the next generation .... [This aid] is merely being cast into a bottomless pit which is
getting bigger day by day ... What we have here is a classic instance of the use of government
subsidies to distort competition." 1981-1982 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 271) 110 (May 6, 1981).
39. For example, in early 1983, a number of steel firms controlled by entrepreneur Willi Korf
began insolvency proceedings in a West German court. Korf's firms were considerably more efficient
than the large state-owned and subsidized firms. Korf blamed his problems in large part on the fact
that prices were forced down by subsidized competitors. See More Korf Companies Seek Protection,
Metal Bull., Jan. 21, 1983, at 23; Korf-Stahl Joins Rush to Court, Metal Bull., Jan. 18, 1983, at 23;
Badische Breaks with Korf Metal Bull., Jan. 14, 1983, at 23; Korfs House of Cards, Metal Bull.,
Jan. 14, 1983, at 25; Korf Goes to Court for Debt Settlement, Metal Bull., Jan. il, 1983, at 31.
40. In 1981, West Germany, which had traditionally avoided massive subsidization, announced its
commitment to a 1.8 billion DM subsidy program, stating: "The Federal Government is not prepared
to accept the fact that massive distortions of competition threaten German jobs, which over the long
run are competitive on an international scale, and endanger the very existence of our steel industry."
Decision of the Federal Government on the German Steel Industry, W. Ger. Press & Information
Office, Bulletin No. 72, S.623 (1981) (in German) (U.S. Steel Law Dep't trans.). Similar aid
programs were launched in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, which had previously avoided large-
scale subsidization. See Steel: In Luxembourg, Aids to the Steel Industry will be Partly Financed by
an Increase in Direct Taxes, Europe, No. 3588 (New Series), Apr. 15, 1983, at 14; Comm'n of the
European Communities, Preliminary Study of Steel Aids 4 (Nov. 1982).
41. The U.S. International Trade Commission has repeatedly found that the U.S. steel industry has
been injured by dumped or subsidized European steel products. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products
From Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West
Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 9087 (1982).
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pean prices, which are uneconomically low, or maintain its own price levels and
surrender its market share to foreign rivals.
42
U.S.-EC competition in steel illustrates how the operation of comparative
advantage can be frustrated. U.S. steel firms once enjoyed a cost advantage over
most European firms in the U.S. market due in part to freight and other costs
which the Europeans incurred simply to deliver their products to American
buyers. 43 Over the last decade, that cost advantage has disappeared because
competing European firms can consistently underprice U.S. firms without con-
cern for recovering their own costs. 44 While improvements in efficiency and
productivity are goals which the industry certainly must pursue, such improve-
ments may be irrelevant to competitiveness in an environment where the volume
of subsidies, rather than comparative efficiency, may ultimately determine com-
petitive outcomes.
Japan and South Africa have developed their own solutions to the phenomenon
of global steel overcapacity and heavy subsidization. They have encouraged or
condoned the virtual sealing off of their domestic steel markets to undesired
imports, thus largely avoiding the issue of how to compete against subsidized
foreign steel at home. 45 Domestic prices are stabilized through cartel agreements
42. The U.S. steel industry is criticized for pricing to cover its average costs in the domestic
market, thereby losing market shares to foreign rivals who price to cover only marginal costs. See,
e.g., Borrus, The Politics of Competitive Erosion in the Steel Industry, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 78 (J. Zysman & L. Tyson eds. 1983). This might be valid criticism if
the foreign producers were, like their U.S. counterparts, privately-owned firms that had to cover their
average costs over the long run in order to remain competitive. Significantly, those U.S. firms that
have deliberately met import prices for a sustained period-such as Armco Steel with its so-called
"Foreign Fighter" program-have experienced disappointing results. The Armco program, em-
ployed at its Houston mill through the late 1970s, matched foreign steel import prices but resulted in
chronic operating losses for the plant. The Houston mill was finally shut down in 1982. See ARaco
STEEL, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. Int'l Tiade Comm'n Inv. No. 731-TA-18/24, at 39-40 (1980)
(statement of Eugene L. Stewart) [hereinafter cited as Stewart Statement].
43. Paine Webber calculated in 1984 that the landed per ton cost of French and West German steel
was still higher than the average per ton cost of U.S.-made steel, despite the overvalued dollar. AM.
IRON & STEEL INST., STATE OF THE AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY 30 (1984) (citing PAINE WEBBER,
WORLD STEEL DYNAMICS (Feb. 1984)).
44. Paine Webber estimates that the steel producers of France and Great Britain suffered a pretax
loss on every ton of steel shipped in between 1976 and 1983. The average-per-ton loss was estimated
at $67.38 and $70.24 for France and Britain, respectively. Id. at 55. A staff member of the U.S.
I.T.C. commented in 1980 that European government financial aid enabled "those steel industries to
sell steel at less than the cost of production over the long run .... Many steel operations in Europe
would close today if they had to sell at cost." Stewart Statement, supra note 42, at 42-43.
45. Through 1984 South Africa required issuance of government permits for steel imports which
were "almost never granted." South Africa Faces 'Import Flood' Warning, Metal Bull., Dec. 13,
1983, at 23. In Japan, distribution of about 90 percent of the steel consumed domestically is handled
by the large trading companies (sogo shosha) which "refrain from dealing in imports of steel
materials because of pressure from blast furnace steelmakers, particularly Nippon Steel Corp." New
Twist in Rade Friction: Japan the Victim, ORIErAL ECONOMIST, Feb. 1983, at 10, 13; see also Steel
Companies are Starting to Experience 'Boomerang Effects', Japan Econ. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 15. As a
result, imports have never accounted for more than about four percent of Japan's domestic consump-
tion. This small percentage has often been smuggled into the country to avoid retaliation. The
Japanese magazine Nikkei Business reported on February 22, 1982 that South Korean importers had
stopped delivering their steel at Tokyo, switching instead to a covert night operation at Osaka where
the steel was secretly off-loaded from freighters onto barges and covered with sheeting: "That is
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or government regulation, and during domestic slump periods, surpluses are
exported at discount prices.46
The experience of the domestic steel industry undercuts the wisdom of the
argument that the solution to such distortions is to invoke existing trade remedies
to restore the "level playing field." This industry has resorted to trade remedies
more than any other during the past decade. 47 These remedies' repeated applica-
tion has not prevented the progressive erosion of the industry's domestic market
by subsidized and dumped foreign steel.
because, in the case of Tokyo, the cargo is followed by trucks (belonging to trucking enterprisers who
are under the control of the influential manufacturers) and the users become known. In the case of
Osaka, it is possible to evade the pursuit of trucks, if the cargo is place on a barge and it meanders
through the canals." Non Tariff Barriers-Techniques for Evasion, NIKKEI BusINESS, Feb. 22, 1982
(in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.) (no page given). Nikkei Business adds, perhaps un-
necessarily, that "this is a full-fledged non-tariff barrier, without a doubt." Id.
46. Japanese steel firms have stabilized domestic prices through formal legal cartels and informal
"administrative guidance" from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In 1975-76,
the curtailment of domestic production pursuant to collusive restrictions on output led to a surge of
low-priced Japanese steel exports, provoking trade disputes with the United States and the European
Community. See Steel Market Getting Out of Stalemate, Nihon Keizai, Feb. 23, 1976, at 13 (in
Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.); Exports of Iron and Steel to U.S. and China Turn Upwards,
Nihon Keizai, Nov. 23, 1975, at 6 (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.); MIT! Revises Outlook
on Demand and Supply of Iron and Steel during October-December Period, Nihon Keizai, Nov. 11,
1975, at 7 (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.). This was no aberration, but a reflection of a
typical recessionary pattern. As Nihon Keizai explained on June 12, 1974:
After 1961, [Japanese] iron and steel exports increased in the years 1962, 1965, 1968 and
197 1, when the country was in a period of recession or retrocession. . . . [Tihe manufacturers
sought an outlet for surplus production, which was caused by a decline in demand at home, in
the expansion of exports. Moreover, overproduction in Japan reached serious proportions in
any period of recession, because equipment investments had been increased greatly in time of
prosperity. The manufacturers, therefore, tried to expand exports, even by reducing export
prices to a level lower than the prices on the home market. As a result, they were suspected of
dumping by importer nations.
Iron and Steel Exports on Crest of Boom, Nihon Keizai, June 12, 1974 (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy,
Tokyo trans.) (no page given). The situation in South Africa is similar. As the Financial Mail reported
on December 4, 1981:
In recent years local production has surpassed demand. The surplus is disposed of abroad at
prices below the domestic ones to help recoup capital costs. . . . South African steel market-
ing strategy is thus similar to that of most other producers: namely, to sell at production-
related costs at home, to check imports wherever possible, and to cut the competition to
ribbons abroad. Local steelmen claim it could not be otherwise. 'How could we be lily-white
champions of free enterprise while others play the game by a different set of rules?' asks one.
'At present you can safely say that anyone who sells on international markets is dumping.'
Pricing for Future Profits, Fin. Mail, Dec. 4, 1981, at 1174.
47. In 1977, U.S. steel producers filed 21 antidumping complaints against Japanese and European
producers. Concerned about the administrative burden of processing so many complex cases and the
implications of the cases for ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, the U.S. government imple-
mented the so-called Thgger Price Mechanism (TPM) in 1978 as an alternative to individual trade
cases. The TPM established a set of minimum "trigger" prices against which the U.S. government
monitored the price levels of steel imports: imports below trigger prices would result in government
initiation of expedited antidumping investigations. Tigger prices were set by reference to costs of
Japanese producers. The TPM enabled higher-cost European mills to sell below their own costs in the
U.S. market. As a result, U.S. producers filed another round of antidumping complaints in 1980. By
late 1981, it was evident that the TPM had failed as a deterrent to dumping. It was suspended in early
1982.
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The problem, in part, is that these are reactive remedies; they cannot be
invoked until evidence of material injury is available. By the time such evidence
can be gathered, presented to the government, and acted upon, substantial addi-
tional injury can occur. Even the most efficient remedies, the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, are cumbersome. They must be invoked against spe-
cific countries and product categories, even though this may entail the costly
filing of dozens of complaints at one time.
In the spring of 1981, an influx of low-priced European steel began, much of it
obviously dumped or subsidized. 48 Evidence of deep, widespread, price under-
cutting had accumulated by late summer and early fall, and import penetration
rates were increasing rapidly, but American steel firms and the U.S. Government
refrained from commencing trade actions because sufficient evidence of injury
had not yet been accumulated. 49 In October, an executive of one U.S. firm
complained that "from what we can see, the government won't be able to find
injury until possibly February, by which time it won't do us any good."3 10
In fact, the first trade actions-five countervailing duty investigations initiated
by the Commerce Department-did not commence until November 1981. Mean-
while, steel imports had increased from 12.3 percent in March to 25.8 percent in
November.51 This influx occurred simultaneously with a major recession in do-
mestic steel demand in mid and late 1981. Between September and November
1981, U.S. steel producers closed more than 23 plants and laid off nearly 50,000
workers. These actions were attributed in significant part to price suppression and
sales lost to imports. 52 U.S. steel producers finally filed an array of countervail-
ing duty and antidumping complaints in January 1982. In response to those
petitions, the U.S. Government began to impose trade sanctions on the European
producers in mid 1982, over a year after the import surge had begun. Although
these sanctions ultimately led to a U.S.-EEC negotiated settlement in October
48. See Steel Distributors Question Future of TRigger System, Am. Metal Market, June 16, 1981, at
1; Customs Service Investigating Alleged Steel Import Frauds, Am. Metal Market, June 15, 1981, at 1;
Europeans Seen Challenging TRiggers, Am. Metal Market., June 1, 1981, at 5. One French producer,
Usinor, openly announced that it was selling steel in the U.S. below TPM levels.
49. See Soft Market, Import Prices Causing U.S. Producers of Wire to Discount, Am. Metal
Market, Oct. 7, 1981, at 1; Steel Imports in Great Lakes Rising, Prices Below TRigger, Am. Metal
Market, Oct. 6, 1981, at I; SSCI Seeks Aid to Plug Trigger System Loopholes, Am. Metal Market,
Sept. 16, 1981, at I; Commerce Steps Up Foreign Steel Probe, Aug. 18, 1981, at 1; Fourth Quarter
Triggers, Extras to Hold, Am. Metal Market, Aug. 17, 1981, at 5; Low-Priced Sheet, Strip Hit U.S.,
Am. Metal Market, Aug. 4, 1981, at 1.
50. Stricter Enforcement of Trigger System Sought by Producers, Am. Metal Market, Oct. 1, 198 1,
at I, 16.
51. See AM. IRON & STEEL INsT, APPARENT SUPPLY OF STEEL MILL PRODUcrs (NET TONs), Dec.
1981, at 1, 2.
52. See Steel Firms Cut Output, Increase Layoffs, Am. Metal Market, Oct. 26, 1981, at 5, 30;
Bethlehem, Ford Cutback Operations, Metal Bull., Oct. 23, 1981, at 31; Market Slump Brings
Further Round of Cuts, Metal Bull., Oct. 16, 1981, at 35; Roderick Threatens Anti-Dumping Action,
Metal Bull., Oct. 13, 1981, at 31; West Coast Steel Slump Deepens as Imports Set Record in East,
Am. Metal Market, Oct. 9, 1981, at I; Weak Demand Hits U.S. Majors, Metal Bull., Oct. 9, 1981 at
31; Steel Mills Balancing Output to Market, Layoffs Growing, Am. Metal Market, Oct. 5, 1981, at 5;
Some Pittsburgh Producers Cutting Back, Am. Metal Market, Sept. 28, 1981, at 8; S&L Agrees to
Buy 5 Pedco Mills, Am. Metal Market, Sept. 10, 1981, at 1.
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1982 in which the Community agreed to restrain its steel exports voluntarily,
substantial injury to the industry had already occurred. 53 Moreover, no sooner
had the U.S.-EC voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) been concluded than a
new surge of low-priced imports developed from newly industrializing countries
like Brazil, Mexico, and the ROK.
Trade complaints did not forestall substantial injury to the U.S. steel industry
in 1981-82, and they have done even less to offset the long-run competitive
imbalance created by foreign government intervention. To remain competitive in
the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. steel industry must undergo intensive moderniza-
tion. Yet, because of its consistently low earnings, it has not been able to generate
the required capital. 54 American critics frequently point to the industry's low
level of investment. 55 In the European community where operating losses have
been far heavier than in the U.S., an intensive investment and modernization
program is being funded by tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies
and low-interest loans. 56 As a result of such subsidies, firms which have suffered
heavy losses each year since 1975-and which would be deemed uncreditworthy
in private capital markets-are reaching a level of modernization that may prove
unattainable for U.S. steel firms. 
57
It should be evident that at least in this industrial sector, fair trade, as we
understand that term, has not existed for some time. The market is distorted;
factors such as subsidies, cartels, and closed home markets, rather than com-
53. The U.S. I.T.C. made numerous preliminary findings-by product line and by country-that
the U.S. steel industry had been materially injured by imports. See, e.g., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
supra note 41.
54. In 1981 the Congressional Budget Office reported: "Just to maintain [U.S. producers'] facili-
ties-or replace them as they physically depreciate on a 25-year cycle-requires capital expenditures
in steelmaking of between $4 billion and $5 billion per year, by the industry's estimate. Because of
poor prospective returns from investment the integrated industry has not attained this level of invest-
ment since 1970." STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 5.
55. The Re-making of Japan's Major Corporations-Nippon Steel, Japan Econ. J., Apr. 17, 1984,
at 7; Rationalization Pressures May Ease, WIRTSCHAPTSWOCHE, Apr. 6, 1984, at 12-15 (in German)
(JPRS trans.). U.S. Steel's acquisition of Marathon Oil in 1982 demonstrates that the industry does
not invest in steel even when funds are available. The acquisition was financed with debt which could
be raised for an investment in oil-an industry with a strong earnings record. It is unlikely these
funds could have been raised, at least on acceptable terms, for an investment in steel. Steel has
become such an unprofitable enterprise worldwide that privately-owned producers in West Germany
and Japan are also diversifying into more profitable lines to improve their overall earnings posture.
56. Between February 1980 and April 1983 the European Commission approved or had pending
before it proposals from European governments requesting over $25 billion in state aid to national
steel industries. Comm'n of the European Communities, Fourth Report on the Application of the
Rules of Aids to the Steel Industry annex 1, 1983 COM 173 final.
57. For example, an important measure of industry modernization is the percentage of steel made
through the highly efficient continuous casting process. In 1983 about 26 percent of U.S. crude steel
production was continuously cast. By contrast, the Belgian steel industry, which has suffered disas-
trous operating losses since 1975, will enjoy a continuous casting ratio of 76 percent in 1985 as a
result of an intensive investment program. Belgian steel subsidies between 1980 and 1983 have been
estimated by the West German Iron & Steel Industry Association at about $3 billion (estimate
converted from Deutschmarks at 2.43:1). See EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL COMMUNITY, INVESTMENT
IN THE COMMUNITY COALMINING AND IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 29 (1982); Time Runs Out for
Steel, Bus. WEEK, June 13, 1983, at 84; Wirtschafsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie, supra note
34, at 21.
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parative efficiency, determine competitive outcomes. In such an environment, it
is inadequate simply to urge U.S. companies to become more competitive or to
invoke traditional trade remedies.
However, the suggested alternative response, that we allow those countries
which have invested heavily in steel to dominate that sector and move the re-
sources currently used in our traditional manufacturing industries into knowl-
edge-intensive high technology sectors in which we enjoy a comparative
advantage, is also inadequate. The problem of foreign mercantilism cannot be
overcome so easily. Government intervention also affects competitive outcomes
in high technology, and the trade remedies, which have proven imperfect in
traditional sectors, are arguably even less effective in the volatile high technology
fields.
B. THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
Conceptually, government intervention on behalf of particular high technology
sectors differs little from classic mercantilism. In both, intervention creates a
comparative advantage for a national industry that would not be possible in a pure
laissez-faire environment. However, the nature of competition in high technology
sectors varies considerably from that in the traditional manufacturing industries.
The emerging forms and effects of government intervention have revealed that
multilateral and unilateral trade remedies are even worse suited to deal with
mercantilism in the high technology area.
Comparative advantage in high technology is determined by the speed and
effectiveness with which producers can develop and subsequently commercialize
technological innovations. In some cases, state intervention can actually retard
this process by stifling innovative initiative through bureaucratic control and
excessive centralization. On the other hand, as the Japanese example shows,
government aid carefully administered at key junctures in the developmental
process can enhance comparative advantage and produce strikingly successful
results in the international market in a remarkably short period.
Development of wholly new technologies requires substantial initial invest-
ments in research and development, followed by intensive capital investments in
the production equipment needed to commercialize the resulting technologies.58
However, because the technology is new, demand for the product is uncertain,
making large research and production investments a risky proposition.
The nature of the competition when the product is commercialized increases
the risk. Producers in a number of high technology industries have discovered
that the unit cost of production declines in a predictable ratio as their cumulative
volume of output increases. This "learning curve" places a premium on entering
the market early and achieving a high sales volume quickly. 59 As one U.S.
58. The U.S. semiconductor industry, for example, invests between 22 and 27 percent of its annual
earnings in research and development and plant and equipment, compared with the average of about
nine percent for U.S. manufacturing industries generally. SEMICONDUCrOR INDUS. ASS'N, THE
INTERNATIONAL MICROELECTRONIC CHALLENGE 24 (1981).
59. This phenomenon was observed in U.S. aircraft production plants during World War II and
was subsequently articulated by the Boston Consulting Group. See BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP,
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semiconductor executive put it: "A year's advantage in introducing a new product
or new process can give a company a 25 percent cost advantage over competing
companies; conversely, a year's lag puts a company at a significant disadvantage
with respect to its competitors." 60
This dynamic tends to produce intense price competition culminating in the
emergence of several market leaders:
The basic objective in pricing a new product should be to prevent competitors from
gaining experience and market share before the new product has achieved major
volume. If this is done, it is possible to achieve a cost advantage over competition
which cannot profitably be overcome by any normal performance on the part of
competitors.61
Government intervention can influence this competitive process in several
ways. First, governments may directly or indirectly provide some of the funding
needed for the research, development, and commercialization of new products.
As technologies become more complex, capital demands increase, and such aid
becomes an increasingly important means of eliminating this initial hurdle. Sec-
ond, governments can reduce some of the risks faced by producers commercializ-
ing new products by ensuring that a demand will exist for them when they are
developed. This can be done by protecting the domestic market 62 or by guaran-
teeing that the government will procure the new products. 63 The initial sales
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERIENCE 10-36 (1970). It has formed the basis for marketing strategy in a
number of high technology industries. A strategy based on the learning curve is most applicable to
high volume commodity-type high technology products like calculators, semiconductors, optical
cable, and some machine tools, where price is an important customer consideration. It is less
significant in sales of large computer and telecommunications systems where price is not an overrid-
ing customer concern.
60. CHARLES RIVER ASSoCIATrS, INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 4-10 (1980) (quoting Robert Noyce).
61. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 59, at 41.
62. Brazil is currently establishing a computer industry within a protected domestic market.
Brazilian industrialist Salvador Perotti described the benefits of such protection in the Sdo Paulo Veja:
"A few years ago, we imported everything and today we are already manufacturing micro-
computers, minicomputers, disks, printers and terminals," said Perotti. According to him,
and practically all the industrialists in the sector, the Brazilian leap is due mainly to the
protected market. He explains: without the protected market, the foreign industries would be
in a position to manufacture and sell in Brazil computers identical to the ones manufactured
by Brazilian industry at a price that Perrotti estimates would be four times less. "That would
decimate our industry, which is beginning to establish itself," he said.
Proceedings of Third Informatics Fair Reported, Veja, Oct. 26, 1983, at 86-89 (in Portugese) (JPRS
trans.).
63. Louis Mexandeau, France's Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, commented on June
16, 1983:
Only about 10 years ago, we French realized that the PTT was becoming one of the
linchpins of the French electronics industry through government purchasing and use of the
telephone network. . . . A French telephone industry has been built gradually through a
policy of government purchasing.
This industry has now acquired international standing, and its influence has spread far
beyond the telephone alone. While an industry like office formation systems is running a trade
deficit of Fr 3.5 billion, telecommunications have registered FR 2 billion in surplus. The
attachment of PTT to the Industry ministry is the indirect result of this successful industrial
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volume from a protected source of demand. makes cost reductions, vital for
successful international competition, possible.
Competition between the U.S. and Japan in high technology illustrates how
decisively government measures can affect competitive outcomes. Japan, which
trailed the U.S. in virtually all high technology sectors in 1970, has pulled
abreast in some product areas (semiconductors) and is arguably leading in some
others (industrial ceramics, fiber optics electronics). That fact reflects Japan's
successful extension of promotional policies once employed in industries like
steel into the high technology sectors. Japan protects its infant high technology
industries as long as they are competitively inferior to U.S. counterparts. 64 The
"nurturing" process involves government-subsidized and supervised joint re-
search and development projects, financial incentives for investment, and, in
some cases, government procurement of new products on highly favorable terms.
When this process proves successful, it enables a Japanese industry to achieve
international competitive parity or superiority within a comparatively short
time-at which point access to the domestic market is liberalized and the Jap-
anese commitment to open markets and free trade in the sector is emphasized. In
effect, this system prevents laissez-faire international competition until Japanese
firms enjoy a comparative advantage, or at least competitive parity. The model
has been successful for Japan and is now being emulated by other governments
eager to create comparative advantage for their own high technology industries. 65
The semiconductor sector offers the classic example of how the Japanese
approach has succeeded in the market. U.S. producers were unchallenged world
leaders in this industry at the beginning of the 1970s. MITI decided in the late
1960s to enhance Japan's competitiveness in this field. 66 It restricted foreign
reconquest. It means that the telecommunications administration has a direct role to play in
electronics communication strategy.
Mexandeau on P7T's Role in Telecommunications Industry, L'Usine Nouvelle, June 16, 1983, at
94-98 (in French) (JPRS trans.).
64. As a group of Japanese firms explained in a 1980 advertisement:
Protection has been provided those industries that are in need of protection because of their
newness and their fragility as emerging industries. Thus protection is negotiated for the
semiconductor and computer industries, and telecommunications .... The impact on tech-
nology level is again direct. Sectors of high value-added, and high technology, with high
growth potential, are afforded as much protection as can be arranged. This allows a nurturing
of technology in the domestic market until competitive scale and sophistication are achieved.
Japanese Technology Today, Sci. AM., Oct. 1980, at J8-10.
65. Le Monde reported on September 22, 1983 that the French Government had launched an Elec-
tronics Sector Action Plan for the years 1982-1986. Subsidies of approximately I billion francs were
granted for research and development and industrial investments in integrated circuits in 1983 alone.
Integrated Circuits Plan: Self-Sufficiency and Profitability Not Just Around the Corner, Le Monde,
Sept. 22, 1983, at 34 (in French) (JPRS trans.); see also Government Subsidizes Electronics Industry
R&D, ELECrRONIQUES ACrUALrrIEs, Sept. 9, 1983, at I, 3 (in French) (JPRS trans.). The Swedish
Government is reportedly committing about $100 million in funds to eight semiconductor develop-
mental projects, designed in part to allay Sweden's current "heavy dependence on imports." Swedish
Five-Year Microelectronics Program Announced, Svenska Dagbladet, Oct. 25, 1983, at 4 (in Swed-
ish) (JPRS trans.).
66. See MITI Plans to Restrict IC Makers, Japan Econ. J., Nov. 19, 1968, at 10; Joint IC
Production is Being Studied by Electronic Enterprises, Japan Econ. J., Aug. 8, 1967, at 15; Elec-
tronics Companies Planning Major Spending on IC Equipment, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 28, 1967, at 14.
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semiconductor investment and sales in Japan, 67 and coordinated the flow of U.S.
semiconductor technology to nine designated Japanese firms, which it encour-
aged to collaborate on research and development.61 Protection from U.S. com-
petition during this period was crucial; in 1972 Japanese semiconductor firms
warned that they would be wiped out if U.S. imports were freely permitted and
that, therefore, the idea of complete liberalization was unacceptable. 69 However,
through the early and mid 1970s the industry's technological level improved and
formal restrictions on sales by American firms to Japan were removed. An
executive director at Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), a major semiconductor
producer, explained how important protection had been to the establishment of
Japan's semiconductor industry:
Looking back, it is quite clear that in the past, Japanese minicomputer makers have
relied on American ICs [integrated circuits] and MITI gave administrative guid-
ance, putting these things on the negative list. I think it was only then that the
domestic industry was able to say to themselves, "now we can consider capital
investment," and they were able to take the first step, because the demand was
stabilized. If MITI had not placed them on the negative list, the computer market
would have been taken over willy-nilly by America. In short, unless there is some
foundation, some backing, no one will have courage to do so. It would be so
risky ...
[S]ince MITI put up the negative list and gave administrative guidance, it was
possible for us for the first time to stand on our own feet. 70
In addition to protection, the Japanese Government actively assisted the lead-
ing semiconductor producers in research, development, and commercialization
67. Semiconductors were placed on the list of import items subject to quantitative restrictions.
Import of these items required issuance of a license. See Eight Import Quota Items Are Freed, Japan
Econ. J., Sept. 1, 1970, at 1, 5; MITI Studies Freeing of 23 Import Items, Japan Econ. J., July 29,
1969, at 1, 2. The semiconductor industry was placed on the so-called negative list so that foreign
majority control was prohibited without prior government approval. See FEO Seeks Sharp Cut Of
'Negative List', Japan Econ. J., Jan. 14, 1969, at I. The Japan Economic Journal observed on July 29,
1969: "Japan had been enforcing such import restrictions . . .without the understanding of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." MITI Studies Freeing of 23 Import Items, supra,
at 2.
68. Texas Instruments Inc. (TI) used its control of patents and technology needed by Japanese
firms as leverage to secure approval of a local subsidiary in 1968. TI raised serious charges of patent
infringement against NEC and threatened to seek an injunction against imports of infringing Japanese
electronics products unless TI was permitted to establish a plant in Japan. In 1968, the company was
allowed to set up a joint venture with Sony (which it bought out in 1972); however, in return TI was
required to license its patents to Nippon Electric, Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony, and Mitsubishi at a
reasonable price and to limit its level of production. MITI subsequently restricted the number of firms
allowed to license technology obtained from TI. See J. TILTON, INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF
TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF SEMICONDUCTORS 146-47 (1971); MITi Plans to Restrict IC Makers,
Japan Econ. J., Nov. 19, 1968, at 10; Japan-U.S. IC Due to Intensify on Domestic Market, Japan
Econ. J., Jan. 30, 1968, at 10; Texas Instruments Co. is Still Insisting on Self-owned Enterprise, Japan
Econ. J., Oct. 31, 1967, at 9; Electronics Companies Planning Major Spending on IC Equipment,
Japan Econ. J., Mar. 28, 1967, at 14;
69. Nihon Kogyo Shimbum, Oct. 30, 1972 (in Japanese) (Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard & McPherson
trans.) (no page or title given).
70. Plunging into IC Liberalization, Nihon Kogyu Shimbum, Dec. 12, 1974 (in Japanese) (Toshio
Tsukahira trans.) (no page given).
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of semiconductor technologies. Assistance was rendered by two rival agencies,
MITI and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). NTT, the government tele-
communications monopoly, possessed the foremost electronics research facilities
in Japan and maintained a special relationship with a "family" of Japanese
companies which supplied it with telecommunications equipment. 7' In 1975,
NTT and MITI launched a loosely-collaborative effort to develop very large scale
integration (VLSI) technology with five leading Japanese producers. 7 2 The NTT
VLSI effort, involving three firms and expenditures by NTT of about $350
million between 1975 and 1982,1 3 resulted in the development of a prototype 64
kilobit random access memory (64K RAM) 74 in 1977 and a prototype 256K
RAM in 1979.75 The MITI effort, involving five firms and subsidies of about
$132 million between 1975 and 1979, resulted in the perfection of numerous
product and process technologies including those used in electron beam lithogra-
phy, a technique needed for production of the 256K RAM.
76
U.S. semiconductor companies had dominated prior generations of RAMs.
However, government backing of the Japanese VLSI effort enabled Japanese
firms to develop the 64K RAM at a lower cost, eliminate technical obstacles to
commercialization, and enter commercial production more quickly than other-
wise would have been possible. 77 Low-interest government loans were provided
to Japanese producers for the commercialization of semiconductor technologies
pursuant to a series of industrial promotion laws. 78 Between 1978 and 1980, the
71. See H. HIRAMATSU, THIS IS THE FACE BEHIND THE TELEPHONE: THE INSIDE STORY OF NTT
AND KDD 106-25 (1980) (in Japanese).
72. See Five Computer Makers Confirm Plans for Joint Development of Ultra LSI, Japan Econ. J.,
July 29, 1975, at 7; Two Makers Will Collaborate in Ultra LSI Development, Japan Econ. J., July 1,
1975, at 7.
73. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Oct. 23, 1982, at I (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.) (no
title given).
74. A RAM is a standard high density memory device used in computers.
75. See Watanabe, Electrical Communication Laboratories: Recent LSI Activities, JAPAN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS REV., Jan. 1979, at 3; Density and Capacity for Magnetic Bubble Memory-256K
Bit Chip Developed, TECHNOCRAT, April 1980, at 39; Responding to Criticism of the Closed Nature,
Complete Opening of Super LSI Patents of NT, Nikkei Sangyo, Feb. 8, 1980 (in Japanese) (Toshio
Tsukahira trans.) (no page given) [hereinafter cited as Responding to Criticism].
76. See Over 1,000 VLSI Technologies Will Be Opened Shortly for Licensing, Japan Econ. J., Sept.
2, 1980, at 9; Cooperating to compete, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 1980, at 75 [hereinafter cited as
Cooperating to compete]; Japan's Semiconductor Industry Is Reaching U.S. Technical Level, Japan
Econ. J., Feb. 26, 1980, at 8.
77. N'T helped Japanese firms overcome a number of technical obstacles to commercialization of
the 64K RAM, including excessive power requirements and gate oxide thickness. It also released 64K
RAM technology to Oki Electric, a non-participating company. Responding to Criticism, supra note
75; Japan Leads One Step in 65K Bit MOS RAM Area, Japan Econ. J., May 30, 1978, at 8, 18. An
executive from NEC, a participating company, indicated that his company's commercialization of the
64K RAM "'would have been delayed six months to one year without the cooperative project."'
Lohr, How Japan Guides Industries, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at D1, D26 (quoting Tomihiro
Matsumura). An executive from the same company commented in 1980 that without the joint effort,
Japanese producers would have spent five times as much on research and development in the develop-
ment of electron beam technology which is critical for the production of the 256K RAM. Cooperat-
ing to compete, supra note 76, at 75.
78. Financial aid measures to semiconductor producers-primarily low interest loans from the
Japan Development Bank-are described in TRADE AND INDUSTRY RESEARCH GROUP, MITI MA-
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leading Japanese producers launched an intensive buildup of production capacity
for the 64K RAM, a phenomenon which observers attributed to "the manage-
ment strategy of giving primary thought to mass production, as faithful ad-
herent[s] of the learning curve." 79
Japanese firms brought 64K RAM capacity on-stream more quickly and in
higher volume than their U.S. counterparts, and accelerated mass production in
the midst of stagnant world demand. 80 The Japan Economic Journal reported on
November 3, 1981 that "[d]emand was not so strong as producers expected
earlier. As a result, prices of 64Ks plunged to around 2,000 yen ($9) or less per
chip from 20,000 yen ($90) only a year earlier.""1
The result was called a competitive "bloodbath": U.S. producers of 64K
RAMs suffered at least $77 million in operating losses on that product between
the first quarter of 1981 and the fourth quarter of 1982.82 Some U.S. companies
that had invested in initial research for the 64K RAM decided against entering the
market, in effect demonstrating the successful use of learning curve tactics by
Japanese firms. 3 At the end of 1982 Japanese firms held two-thirds of the world
market for the device.
While a 1983-84 boom in demand for 64K RAMs has alleviated the com-
petitive pressure on U.S. producers, Japanese firms are well positioned for the
next generation product, the 256K RAM. They have received substantial as-
sistance in commercializing this device from NTT, and they entered commercial
CHINE AND INFORMATION BUREAU, EXCERPTS FROM COMMENTARY ON PUBLIC LAW 84, LAW FOR
PROVISIONAL MEASURES FOR THE PROMOTION OF DESIGNATED MACHINE AND INFORMATION IN-
DUSTRIES (1978) (SIA trans.).
79. VLSI War (Part 2)-Fall in 'Bogged down' Market-To One-Tenth in a Year: Users' Enthusi-
asm for Purchasing Stimulated, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, Dec. 17, 1981, at 5 (in Japanese) (U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo trans.); see also Competition Around VLSI's, TECHNOCRAT, Jan. 1982, at 54.
80. By early 1981, three U.S. firms were producing 64K RAMS, and six Japanese firms had begun
large scale commercial production. All six were engaged in large sale production (defined as 20,000
or more units per month) by the second quarter of 1981. See SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS. ASS'N, THE
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT TARGETING ON WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR COMPETITION 35-36 (1983).
81. Hitachi Will Greatly Boost Output of 64K RAM Chips, Japan Econ. J., Nov. 3, 1981, at 8.
Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun commented on December 17, 1981 that "it can be said that such a downward
curve [in prices] is as to slide down a cliff..... VLSI War (Part 2)-Fall in Bogged Down Market-
To One-Tenth in a Year: Users' Enthusiasm for Purchasing Stimulated, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun,
Dec. 17, 1981, at 5 (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.).
82. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 80, at 39. An executive from NEC, one of the
leading Japanese producers of the 64K RAM, commented that "the Japanese perspective is that when
you are making inroads into a market you can't afford the luxury of making money." Chip Wars: The
Japanese Threat, Bus. WK., May 23, 1983, at 82, 83 [hereinafter cited as Chip Wars].
83. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS. Ass'N, supra note 80, at 60-61. In December 1981, Nikkei Sangyo
Shimbun observed:
Semi-conductors are a typical industry of the sure-victory-by-the-first-move-type. "If ultra-
modern products are produced belatedly, there will arise the vicious cycle of buyers being
taken away when the products appear on the market, and not being able to recover the next
investment because the price falls rapidly" [quoting Hitachi Board Chairman Yoshiyama].
Some semi-conductor manufacturers of the U.S. retreated from or gave up the production of
64-kilo-bit RAM's because they firmed up the judgment that if they start production in the face
of the big offensive by Japanese manufacturers, it will be too late.
VLSI War (Part 1)-Competition for Increased Production Overheating, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun,
Dec. 16, 1981, at 5 (in Japanese) (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo trans.).
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production in 1982.14 While a number of U.S. firms may ultimately produce
256K RAMs, U.S. semiconductor industry sources predict that Japanese firms
will dominate this product line more decisively than they have the 64K RAM. 
85
In effect, within the space of six years, Japanese semiconductor producers have
leapfrogged an early U.S. lead and secured a dominant position in a critical high
technology product line with a multi-billion dollar market potential.
Several things are striking about this episode. One is the comparative speed
and decisiveness with which the Japanese were able to transform their trailing
market position into a commanding competitive lead through a combination of
home market protection and subsidized joint research and development. The
second is the virtual irrelevance of trade remedies as tools for countering this
Japanese promotional effort.
The timeliness problem noted with respect to steel is even more acute in this
instance. The most intense Japanese price-cutting in 64K RAMs took place over
a period of approximately 12 months, and Japanese firms secured a commanding
market position during that period which they have not subsequently relin-
quished. The available U.S. trade remedies probably would not have offered
timely relief even if complaints had been filed early on, because, at that point,
adequate evidence of injury would not have been available.
In any event, the antidumping and countervailing duty laws do not offer the
hope of an effective remedy. A countervailing duty imposed on the Japanese
VLSI research subsidies would bear no relationship to the practical effects of
those subsidies in the market; that is, they would not affect the ability of Japanese
firms to dominate the world market for one generation, and probably future
generations, of a strategic high technology product line in a multi-billion dollar
market. The antidumping laws are also of questionable relevance, since there was
no demonstrable price discrimination between Japanese home and export mar-
kets, and "since costs of production decline as learning curve efficiencies are
obtained, the average cost of a product can be very difficult to estimate before the
product life cycle has run its course."
8 6
The recent experience in random access memories is not an aberration. A
similar pattern of competitive tactics-a home market protection, government
research and development subsidies, a rapid capacity buildup, and ultimately, an
aggressive export drive-has occurred or is occurring in other high technology
sectors in Japan and elsewhere. Under such circumstances, a U.S policy based
primarily on a passive reliance on "the market" to determine our economic
future may be dangerously naive.
III. POSSIBLE NEW DIRECTIONS
It would be easy to survey the broad range of measures taken by foreign
governments to enhance the competitive advantages enjoyed by their industries
84. Japan Cos. Get NTTs 256K Skills, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Oct. 11, 1982, at C.
85. See Pollack, The Selling of the 256K RAM, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1983, at DI; Chip Wars, supra
note 82, at 82.
86. Wolff, supra note 21, at 356.
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and conclude, first, that an open world trading system is an unattainable goal,
and second, that we would do best to erect a wall of trade barriers to protect our
own market. In doing so, however, much would be lost. Not only would other
countries follow the U.S. lead, thus foreclosing important export markets for our
industries, but our own economy would be deprived of the considerable benefit of
foreign products that do reflect true comparative advantages enjoyed by foreign
producers. Our exasperation at the effects of foreign government market inter-
vention in particular sectors should not cause us to abandon our support for a
world trading order that has been, and remains, the source of immense economic
benefit to us.
At the same time, however, mere reliance on laissez-faire and existing trade
remedies is a wholly inadequate response to the current international competitive
environment. Government intervention and its effects are real and increasing.
They cannot be adequately addressed by mere exhortations to U.S. industries to
compete vigorously. Through continued reliance on the working of the market,
we risk having our own economic future dictated by the industrial policy deci-
sions of foreign governments. Indeed, to some extent, this is already happening.
If we are to chart a course between a return to the protectionism of the 1930s
and the hazards of rigid adherence to laissez-faire in an era of resurgent mercan-
tilism, we need to proceed from a new set of basic assumptions. We must
recognize that the postwar GATT consensus on common norms of fair trade
competition no longer exists. Other nations can and do deliberately create ar-
tificial comparative advantage for their industries. Our response must not be a
mere appeal for equity but negotiations backed by the threat of sanctions de-
signed to nullify the effects of artificial advantages. Such an approach presup-
poses a more consciously nationalistic, less impartially adjudicative role for the
U.S. Government. We ourselves need not embrace a mercantilist trade policy,
but our continuing pursuit of open world markets and nonintervention must be
tempered by a greater degree of realism and a willingness to use the leverage
which we enjoy-including access to our market-to secure those ends.8
7
Ultimately, the most satisfactory negotiated solution would be one that extends
the rules of the multilateral trading system to cover foreign government policies
which are aimed at creating artificial comparative advantages. The United States
has attempted such reform but has encountered considerable resistance. Coun-
tries that have already been successful in creating such advantages are unlikely to
87. Various legislative initiatives have been introduced in the U.S. Congress in the 1980s which
would authorize the U.S. government to accord "reciprocal" treatment to the products of another
country which restricts U.S. access to its markets. Reciprocity proposals have been criticized as a
radical departure from GATT multilateralism: "[D]ispute settlement reverts from the existing multi-
lateral approach through the GAIT to a bilateral or unilateral focus .... Reciprocity extended to its
logical conclusion would establish a new order requiring a multiplicity of reciprocal bilateral and
sectoral trade and investment policies." Hay & Sulzenko, U.S. Trade Policy and 'Reciprocity', J.
WORLD TRADE L. 471, 475-76 (1982). In fact, however, a multiplicity of bilateral policies already
exists at the practical level-manifested in the varying degrees of real market access that exist
between various bilateral trading partners, whatever their formal multilateral commitments may be
under GAIT. Reciprocity would seek to supplant de facto bilateral impediments to trade with bilateral
agreements eliminating those impediments. This objective has not always proven attainable within the
multilateral GAIT framework.
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limit their ability to do so again, and others are unlikely to foreclose the oppor-
tunity to try to create similar advantages. In either case, the United States loses
and the multilateral system moves further from the ideal world of comparative
advantage. Given the limits of a multilateral approach, our only recourse may
well be a bilateral one.
Administrative and legislative reforms may be required to facilitate the nego-
tiating process. Other nations use a panoply of mutually-reinforcing promotional
measures to impart advantage to their industries; our current trade remedies offer
a piecemeal and frequently inadequate response. A comprehensive promotional
program should be offset by a comprehensive response, which may entail ap-
plication of a series of mutually-reinforcing trade and domestic policies. The
existence of a more flexible and efficient array of responses than currently exists
would facilitate this process, as would the centralization of authority in a single
agency to administer and coordinate an effective response.
One of the principal weaknesses of our current system of trade remedies is its
reactive nature. Relief is usually forthcoming, if at all, only after injury has
occurred and often after a permanent shift in competitive advantage has taken
place. This must change. Active monitoring of foreign government industrial
programs by the U.S. Government-coupled with a willingness to apply trade
remedies in a preemptive, rather than a reactive, mode-may form part of the
answer to this problem. The certainty that a promotional program designed to
create artificial comparative advantage will be met by a comprehensive U.S.
response may ultimately deprive such programs of some of their appeal.
Finally, there is no reason why the U.S. Government should not take a more
active role in seeking to enhance generally the competitiveness of all U.S. indus-
tries through policies that create an environment in which competitive industries
may more readily flourish. This would include measures that encourage tech-
nological development and greater industrial efficiency throughout the entire
economy, such as increased financial aid for technical education, tax incentives
for research and development and industrial rationalization, antitrust reform, and
improved patent protection.
Such measures would establish a closer correlation between our trade policy
and our own economic interests, but they would not herald an abandonment of
our basic commitment to open markets and free trade. We should remain willing
to compete, on a purely laissez-faire basis, with any nation willing to do so on
those terms. However, a more decisive response by this country to mercantilism
is essential if we are to preserve a world trade order where such open competition
is the norm, rather than the exception.
